Program on States and Security

My research seeks to explain international peacebuilding failures in civil wars through an analysis of the Democratic Republic of Congo's transition from war to peace and democracy (2003-2007). In the Congo, why did international peace builders succeed in imposing a settlement only at the international and national levels and not at the subnational level? Why couldn't a lasting peace and security be achieved despite intense peace building efforts? More generally, why are peace builders often unsuccessful in addressing the local failures of peace processes? Based on over 300 interviews, field observations in the Congo, and document analysis, I argue that, in the Congo like in many other post-conflict environments, international actors erroneously perceive the presence of local violence as unrelated to the success or failure of peace processes.
Research finding #1: Political and military interventions should address tensions not only at the national and international level, but also at the local level, the level of the family, the clan, the village, or the district.
International peace builders involved in the Congolese transition should have addressed local violence for two main reasons. First, the humanitarian cost of local antagonisms that turned violent was staggering. Second, the neglect of local issues could lead only to incomplete and unsustainable peace settlements. Local manifestations of violence, although often related to national or international struggles, were also precipitated by distinctively local problems. These included conflict over land, mineral resources, traditional power, local taxes, and the relative social status of specific groups and individuals. Even issues usually presented as international questions (such as the problem with Rwandan Hutu militias) or national ones (such as ethnic tensions with Congolese Rwandophones) had significant local components, which fueled and reinforced the regional and international dimensions.
Local, national, and international dimensions of violence remained closely interlinked in most of the eastern Congo. Local agendas provided national and regional actors with local allies, who were crucial in maintaining military control, continuing resource exploitation, and persecuting political or ethnic enemies. Local tensions could also jeopardize the national and international reconciliation: for example, by motivating violence against the Rwandophone ethnic minority or allowing a strong presence of Rwandan Hutu militias in the Kivus. In addition, during the transition, some local conflicts became autonomous from the national and international tracks, most notably in the provinces of South Kivu and North Katanga. There local disputes over political power, economic resources (especially land and mining sites), and social status led to clashes that no national or international actors could stop.